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Abstract— In wireless ad hoc networks, protecting source 
and destination nodes’ location privacy is a challenging 
task due to malicious traffic analysis and privacy attacks. 
Existing solutions, such as incorporating fake source-
destination pairs in the network, provide some privacy of 
real source and destination nodes against attackers. 
Moreover, ad hoc networks need stronger privacy 
protection against powerful global attacker which has 
knowledge of overall network topology and, that can also 
eavesdrop and visualize network-wide data transmissions. 
In this paper, we present a novel privacy technique, 
EXTROUT: Route Extrapolation to camouflage the real 
source and destination nodes along an extended path in an 
ad hoc network.  We demonstrate that the privacy level 
achieved with EXTROUT is higher and more effective 
against a global attacker, when compared to fake source-
destination nodes privacy scheme.   
 
Keywords-  Privacy, anonymity, wireless ad hoc network, global 
attacker; route extrapolation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In wireless ad hoc networks, source and destination nodes 
communicate directly if they are within transmission range of 
each other, else they rely on intermediate nodes for packet 
routing. Broadcast transmission in ad hoc wireless 
communication is prone to malicious traffic analysis attacks 
[1][2]. In general, traffic analysis attacks involve 
communication pattern observations, traffic rate monitoring 
and time correlation of nodes’ transmissions that are used to 
gain high level contextual information such as direction of 
traffic flow, traffic pattern and the source-destination location. 
Network-wide traffic rate monitoring attack [3][4] is done by 
eavesdropping and counting the number of 
transmitted/received packets around every node in the 
network, while network-wide time-correlation attacks [3][4] 
necessitate finding the general communication patterns or 
source-destination relationships.  
A global view of network traffic patterns often reveal strong 
correlation, traffic contours or local maxima nodes that help 
global adversaries locate strategic nodes that are suspected 
sources and destinations [2][4]. Contextual privacy problem in 
wireless ad hoc networks, such as traffic direction inference, is 
mainly addressed by anti-traffic analysis techniques and 
context concealment methods that make it hard to trace back 
routes and localize source/destination. Link-by-link encryption 
scheme, commonly assumed in most research work, can only 
protect traffic content privacy [5]. Other methods, like padding 
to hide potential packet types through size and use of 
anonymous routing schemes cannot prevent traffic analysis 
attack completely. However, traffic cover with dummy packet 
insertion can obfuscate the real traffic patterns aspect, but has 
other implications on energy constraints, bandwidth utilization 
and overhead [6].  
Strong privacy mechanism is crucial to protect 
source/destination nodes’ location from target-oriented attacks 
and anonymize communication traffic to mitigate traffic 
analysis attacks. Source-destination pair privacy disclosure 
can be avoided by preventing an attacker to identify the true or 
exact starting node (i.e. source) and ending node (destination) 
of shortest path communication. In this work, we propose 
EXTROUT, Route Extrapolation, a simple and flexible 
privacy protocol to preserve source and destination privacy 
against a global powerful adversary. Source and destination 
nodes’ privacy in large ad hoc wireless networks is achieved 
by camouflaging their transmission behavior among other 
identical broadcasting nodes. The two usual end nodes on a 
path (i.e. source and destination nodes) are concealed by 
extending the routing path by a random number of hops 
beyond destination node and source node, independently. 
EXTROUT also broadcasts dummy packets in an efficient 
way to make all nodes (including source and destination) 
along the extrapolated path appear indistinguishable. This will 
mask the origin and end of real packet flow. We compare 
EXTROUT with another commonly used privacy technique, 
called Fake Source-Destination pairs [10][11], and evaluate 
them against a global attacker model using privacy assessment 
metrics. There is trade-off between desired privacy strength 
and communication overhead cost. Hence, we also study how 
much privacy is achieved for different transmission overhead.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes related work on popular privacy techniques. Section 
3 presents the network assumptions, attacker model and 
privacy metrics. The details of EXTROUT privacy protocol 
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are explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents privacy strength 
analysis. Section 6 briefly explains fake source-destination 
pair set-up. Section 7 reports the simulation results and related 
discussions. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Privacy mechanisms for ad hoc sensor networks have been 
studied previously [7][8] but a solution that achieves efficient 
and flexible privacy guarantees against global attacker remains 
elusive. Some privacy protocols proposed in the literature 
have considered the problem of location privacy either for the 
source node [9] [10] or the destination [2], independently, 
from a local eavesdropper, whilst other solutions deal with 
anti-traffic analysis techniques. It is more difficult implement 
source and destination privacy techniques in sparse traffic 
network, such as single source-destination case, against global 
eavesdropper. 
Privacy protocols, such as [11][10][2][9][12][8], have 
focused on traffic pattern concealment methods for 
anonymous routing. Multipath traffic flows create some 
confusion about routes taken by packets to reach destination. 
The privacy performance when splitting packet flows in 
different or random ways spatially and temporally on multiple 
paths has been investigated in [12] using ‘traffic entropy’ 
measurement. But, a global attacker can still observe high 
traffic density near source region (as multipaths traffic flows 
diverge from source) and traffic accumulation when 
approaching destination region (as multipaths traffic flows 
converge towards destination). In baseline broadcast flooding 
[13], each node transmits the received packet to all its 
neighbor nodes in the network once. Flooding exhibits 
maximal coverage, redundancy and shortest path distance 
preservation. However, in real conditions, full scale flooding 
is energy expensive.  
Dummy Traffic: The idea of dummy traffic in [3] is to 
properly insert dummy/fake packets in the real payload traffic 
stream so that the real traffic pattern is disguised. Source-
destination communication characteristics are masked when 
dummy traffic adheres to a predefined pattern/behavior. With 
encrypted dummy packets as traffic padding, the adversary 
cannot even differentiate real packets from dummy packets. 
The delay experienced by real payload packets of a dummy 
protected flow depends on link bandwidth available. Thus, 
baseline dummy traffic generation increases communication 
overhead with extra energy consumption cost, while 
obfuscating node’s real packet transmission occurrence. A 
constant rate dummy traffic over entire network will make all 
real packet transmissions undistinguishable, thus complicating 
rate monitoring (packet counting) attacks.  
Fake Source-Destination Pair: The work in [11] initially 
proposed to create more replica sources (or fake sources) that 
input surplus dummy packets into the network traffic. Short-
lived (temporary) fake sources provide better privacy strength 
against local attackers which cannot visualize the whole 
network topology and traffic flow. A long-lived (persistent) 
fake source node continuously generates dummy packets and 
gives a stronger privacy protection against global attacker with 
network-wide traffic knowledge. However, fake source-
destination placement is decisive to create maximum 
uncertainty about the real source-destination location. For 
example, a fake source is normally positioned at the opposite 
direction with comparable route length as the real source-
destination, and fake packet rate should also be comparable to 
that of the real source node [10].  The objective of fake 
source/destination nodes and dummy traffic method is to 
introduce unlinkability between source-destination traffic flow 
and communication direction that prevents contextual 
information disclosure.  
In other related work [7], the authors proposed the use of 
two anonymous zones to preserve the anonymity of a source-
destination pair, where a source or a destination is hidden 
anonymously among a group of other nodes. Flooding is 
confined in the local area of anonymous zones. In [14], the 
authors proposed SECLOUD privacy scheme, which also 
hides the source and destination in a group of nodes (called 
“clouds”) that are indistinguishable in the presence of global 
traffic visualization attack. Mehta et al. [1] used a privacy 
scheme under global external attack model by hiding the real 
source among k-1 fake sources simulating the mobility pattern 
of real source in sensor network. 
III. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
A. Network Model 
We assume a large ad hoc network model, typically 
consisting of hundreds of nodes that are distributed randomly 
or in a perturbed grid arrangement. The nodes are assumed 
quasi-static with sufficient battery power. Each node also has 
symmetric wireless links, i.e. has the same transmission and 
receiving range. Non-neighboring nodes communicate with 
each other via multi-hop links. At the medium access control 
(MAC) layer, we assume that each node runs IEEE 802.11 
MAC interface in the "promiscuous" mode to receive all the 
MAC frames broadcasted in its neighborhood and all packet 
transmissions are also assumed to be locally broadcasted 1-
hop distance range and not necessarily acknowledged. The 
existence of a key management protocol is implicit and pair-
wise keys are distributed between nodes, for example using an 
efficient symmetric key protocol such as in [15][16].  All data 
and control packets transmitted have same size, are encrypted 
and no information is divulged to external attackers either 
through packet data or header content. Network nodes can 
distinguish different packet types (e.g. dummy packet from a 
real packet) by including a special tag which is itself encrypted 
in the packet; however the attacker cannot make this 
distinction. In [17], the authors used short-lived disposable 
MAC addresses to prevent the real node IDs from being 
revealed to adversaries. Finally, route discovery 
communications are assumed to be anonymous using any of 
the efficient anonymous routing protocols such as in [18][19].  
Our assumptions are consistent with related works in the 
literature. 
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B. Attacker model 
In [1][12][20], the authors assumed global attacker with 
strong capabilities. A global attacker can eavesdrop every 
packet transmission in the network, trace the encrypted 
packets, and analyze network-wide traffic rate as well as 
correlate transmission times between nodes. Traffic contours, 
interconnection and intersection paths of online nodes can be 
inspected to divulge source and destination points. A number 
of inferences are derived from nodal packet count evidences 
and are used to estimate the probability of past packet 
movement itineraries. In this work, we do not consider 
attackers trying to disrupt the communication by jamming or 
route breaking or DoS attack. Hence, we also assume passive 
global attacker that performs rate monitoring and time 
correlation attacks for all traffic in the network. The attacker 
will visualize all transmitted/received packets in the network 
and determine traffic density on every link in the ad hoc 
network. However, the attacker cannot inject, modify or 
interrupt packet transmissions and can neither decrypt the 
content of captured packets. Since hop-by-hop packet re-
encryption with different keys is applied, the attacker cannot 
trace the same packet on different links by examining the 
packet content. We focus on a global attacker with the 
endeavor to locate source and destination nodes in a wireless 
ad hoc network. This is similar to the idea in [12], where a 
global adversary is modeled as consisting of a number of 
colluding local adversaries that cooperate together and share 
information through a dedicated communication channel. An 
attacking network overlaid on top of the target network has 
also been considered in [1] as a realistic set up of the global 
adversary to eavesdrop the overall network communication.  
C. Privacy Metrics 
The performance of EXTROUT is evaluated using 
anonymity and unlinkability metrics.  
Anonymity: It means to obfuscate the real 
source/destination nodes in a group of indistinguishable nodes 
[21] [22] [23]. If the source node is hidden in a set of nodes GS 
and the destination is hidden in an independent group of GD 
nodes, the anonymity level of the source-destination pair is 
given as λ = 1 – (1/GS)(1/GD). 
Unlinkability [23] [24]: Privacy is maintained if packet 
transmissions are not linkable to any potential source or 
destination nodes. To test unlinkability, we employ traffic 
pattern visualization approach to identify hot spot traffic, 
traffic directionality/shape, local maxima nodes, traffic 
convergence and divergence. Perfect unlinkability between 
source-destination pair anonymous routing is comparable to a 
purely random guess, i.e. all nodes are in an indistinguishable 
state [24]. Uniformly distributed traffic in an ad hoc wireless 
network exhibits superior unlinkability performance under 
traffic analysis attacks.  
IV. EXTROUT PRIVACY PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
In this section we describe the EXTROUT privacy protocol, 
which camouflage source-destination (S-D) nodes in ad hoc 
wireless networks. The idea is based on route extrapolation 
mechanism. Cover traffic, using dummy packets broadcasted 
by all nodes on the extrapolated route, masks the real packet 
transmission in the network at any given time. Traffic padding 
at link-level also conceals route discovery phase and 
initialization. For the functionality of EXTROUT protocol, we 
assume that all nodes have knowledge of the ad hoc network 
topology using any anonymous proactive routing protocol, 
such as [18][19], as mentioned before.   
EXTROUT privacy protocol operates in three phases: (i) 
Initialization of S-D path, (ii) Route extrapolation source-side 
(to Anchor_S) and destination-side (to Anchor_D), and (iii) 
Dummy traffic generation. 
A. Phase 1- Initialization of S-D path 
For setup and initialization, a route discovery process is 
initiated by source node (S) assembling a route request (RQ) 
packet and locally broadcasting it. Strong and efficient 
anonymous on demand routing protocols similar as reported in 
the literature [18] [25] can be used.  The packet delivery path 
is set up after each node on the requested path replies and 
confirms the route to reach the destination. To prevent rate 
monitoring and time correlation attacks during initialization 
phase, route discovery packets can be concealed by 
periodically generating dummy traffic at a low rate (e.g. 
residual cover traffic) network-wide. Residual dummy traffic 
acts as “background noise” to conceal management and 
control packets transmissions during set up of source-
destination path. For sensitive applications demanding 
maximum anonymity, this initialization overhead is worth the 
privacy gain. All nodes will transmit in broadcast mode at 
constant rate or probabilistic rate so that the attacker cannot 
link different transmission locations. An attacker can only 
infer position of transmissions using signal strength of packet 
and any existing localization algorithm.  
B. Phase 2 – S-D Route Extrapolation 
 
Figure 1.  Route Extrapolation 
Route extrapolation extends the shortest path, derived 
using Dijkstra algorithm, beyond the source (S) and 
destination (D) nodes on both sides. Fig. 1 shows the route 
extrapolation arrangement. Source node S first selects a 1st hop 
neighbor node i, denoted as N(1,i), excluding the node on 
shortest path S-D (of length L), that can reach node D via node 
S in (L+1) hops length. Next, node S selects a 2nd hop 
neighbor node N(2,i) that can reach node D through (L+2) 
hops distance via node S. Subsequently, node S will select a 
list of nodes that extrapolates its shortest path S-D by linking 
successive nodes sequence N(1, i), N(2, i), … , N(Ks, i). The 
furthest node N(Ks, i) from source S, called Anchor_S node, is 
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(L+Ks) hops away from the destination D along the extended 
shortest path via the node S. The value of Ks is set randomly 
by source S so that the extrapolation distance from Anchor_S 
to node S is unknown to the attacker. 
Route extrapolation is applied in a similar manner by node 
D on destination side. Destination node D will select a list of 
nodes that extrapolates the shortest path S-D to link successive 
nodes sequence from N(1,j), N(2, j), …,  N(Kd,j). The farthest 
node N(Kd,j) from D, i.e. Anchor_D node, is (L+Kd) hops 
away from source S along the extended shortest path. The 
value of Kd is set randomly by the destination D. 
C. Phase 3 -  Dummy Traffic Generation 
To obfuscate real packet transmission from eavesdropping 
attackers, dummy traffic (called “noise traffic”) is generated at 
suitable rate, e.g. constant rate or probabilistic rate. All nodes 
on the extrapolated route from Anchor_S to Anchor_D will 
permanently broadcast background noise traffic by 
continuously generating dummy packets at a rate identical to 
the source S. As in [12][14], for EXTROUT protocol, all 
dummy (and real) packets have same size, are encrypted by 
different per-packet encryption keys at each node. 
For a link (x, y), node x will broadcast a dummy 
packet, only next-hop node y receiving it must identify and 
continue with another dummy packet broadcast, while other 
neighbor nodes  of x will ignore the dummy traffic received. 
For example in Fig. 2, with traffic flow from node ‘a’ to node 
‘d’ at the rate of A1 packets/second and another independent 
flow from ‘b’ to ‘d’ at the rate of A2 packets/second, assuming 
A1 > A2. Cover traffic (ε) will be introduced on the link a-b by 
making node ‘a’ broadcast dummy packets equal to A2. As 
mentioned, per-link encryption mechanism would prevent an 
attacker from distinguishing dummy packets (ε) from real 
packets (A1 or A2) and the attacker cannot trace back specific 
packets to determine which packet belongs to which source-
destination traffic flow. 
 
Figure 2.  Dummy traffic 
With the above set up, EXTROUT uses the shortest 
path (or an available direct path) to send packet to the 
destination D. Unusual high traffic nodes will not arise (except 
for nodes on path crossing) and there is uniform traffic density 
between Anchor_S and Anchor_D. Moreover, the edge/end 
nodes of the traffic are not necessarily the source or 
destination point. Extended path adds robustness against 
physical attacks on the source and destination node, e.g. in 
military ad hoc networks in battlefield. The attacker has to 
guess and destroy may be several nodes that are not clustered. 
Hence the physical attack to destroy the source or destination 
becomes expensive. 
D. EXTROUT with Path Duplication  
Enhanced EXTROUT with path duplication method 
replicates the traffic flow between Anchor_S and Anchor_D 
using a number of disjoint routes between Anchor_S and 
Anchor_D. Let P ={P1, P2, …Pj} be the set of j disjoint paths 
from Anchor_S to Anchor_D, excluding the shortest path L. 
One or more disjoint paths Pj are randomly selected and 
activated to emulate the traffic rate on path from Anchor_S to 
Anchor_D. Path Pj behaves as a fake/duplicate path to 
increase probability of misleading attacker. EXTROUT with 
path duplication increases the anonymity level (at the cost of 
extra transmission overhead) by increasing the number of 
permutations for source-destination pairs on different paths 
perceptible to the attacker. 
V. PRIVACY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Keeping the extrapolated path longer and of random length 
improves anonymity, especially in single source-destination 
case when the network has low traffic load. Compared to other 
techniques in the literature, the EXTROUT preserves the 
privacy for uplink and downlink traffic of nodes. 
A. EXTROUT Privacy  
The path length from source S to destination D is L hops. 
Ks and Kd hops are the extended path segments on source side 
and destination side, respectively. Total path length from 
Anchor_S to Anchor_D is (Ks + L + Kd) hops. Probability of 
selecting correct source/destination node is 
)(
1
ds KLK ++
. If 
EXTROUT with duplicated paths (P1, P2,…Pn) have n disjoint 
paths and assuming that the probability that one path being 
compromised/attacked is independent of others, then the 
probability of correctly selecting real traffic path and correct 
source-destination node pair will be 
)(
1
1
1
ds KLKn ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
. 
EXTROUT protocol improves the S-D pair privacy 
(anonymity) statistically when more redundant (duplicate) 
disjoint paths are used between Anchor_S and Anchor_D. 
The protection of a path or a set of nodes from being 
compromised is another issue under our future work scope. 
B. EXTROUT Transmission Overhead 
The transmission overhead factor (TOF) is considered as the 
ratio of total number of packets transmitted by nodes using 
privacy technique to the total transmissions without privacy 
technique using shortest path routing. TOF for baseline 
EXTROUT is given by (Ks + L+ Kd )/L. 
VI. SHORTEST PATH WITH N-FAKE SOURCE-DESTINATION 
PAIRS 
In fake source-destination privacy technique [1][11][12], a 
number of fake source-destination pairs (Sf, Df) are activated 
so that bogus communication route is established between 
them to persistently transmit dummy (fake) packets at the 
same rate as the real source S whose location privacy we need 
to protect. The position of (Sf, Df) node pairs and the path 
length are important aspects to ensure effectiveness of this 
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privacy enhancement scheme. Ideally, distance (Lf) between Sf 
and Df must be comparable to distance (L) between S and D 
nodes. The anonymity set for source S is the group of nodes at 
the extremities of the routing paths, i.e. {S, Sf1, Sf2,…., Sfn} and 
the destination anonymity set are the one-hop neighbors of the 
nodes {D, Df1, Df2,…Dfn}, where n is the number of fake (Sf, 
Df) pairs. The source-destination node location anonymity 
level is {1 – (n+1)-1}. Assuming real S-D and all fake Sf-Df 
have same packet transmission rate, transmission overhead 
factor (TOF) with n fake S-D technique is given 
by LLL
n
i
fi /)(
1
∑
=
+ . Fake source-destination pairs contributing to 
privacy enforcement must communicate as long as the real 
source has packets to send to its real destination. 
VII. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
Our simulation based on NS-2 consists of a quasi-stationary 
ad hoc network of 400 nodes distributed in an area of 2000m × 
2000m with average node degree 7 (except for boundary 
nodes). Quasi-Unit disk graph (Q-UDG) connectivity model 
[26] is applied to simulate real world wireless network 
topologies. The (x, y) coordinates position of each node were 
randomly chosen in the ranges (x-pxi , x+pxi) and (y-pyi , 
y+pyi), respectively, where p is a perturbation parameter and xi 
and yi are the spacing between the nodes in the x and y 
directions, respectively ( p = 0.25 and xi = yi = i × 100 for 0 ≤ i 
≤ 20 were assigned for simulations). For more randomness in 
node distribution, we can increase the magnitude of 
perturbation parameter p, (0 ≤  p ≤ 1). After nodes distribution, 
the Q-UDG connectivity model and transmission range are 
used to construct the network topology. A link exists between 
two nodes if the inter-nodal distance d ˂ αR, where R is the 
transmission range of the node and α is the Q-UDG factor (0 ≤ 
α ≤ 1). In our simulations, we set α = 0.25 and R=145m. For 
inter-nodal distance d ˃ R, there is no link connectivity. But, 
for αR ≤ d ≤ R, the link will exist with probability (R-d)/(R- 
αR). The source node (S) and destination node (D) are 
selected and a fixed number of real packets (e.g. 7000) are 
sent from S to D in a time window of T seconds. All 
simulations are repeated 20 times and results are averaged for 
each tested scenario. A matrix representation is used to 
indicate the approximate node positions in the network and the 
number of packets ui transmitted by each node i (where 1 ≤ i ≤ 
400). 
A. Privacy with Fake Source-Destination 
Fig. 3 shows the network matrix of number of packets 
transmitted by all nodes when using 1-Fake S-D pair privacy 
method. The real source (S) and fake source (Sf), each sends 
7000 packets (real packets by S and dummy packets by Sf) to 
the real destination (D) and fake destination (Df), respectively, 
using the shortest path. By inspection, the traffic pattern 
reveals the location of the fake and real source/destination 
nodes which are at the ends of the single path. The global 
attacker can guess the real source (D) or real destination node 
(D) with probability ½, therefore anonymity level is ½, and the 
transmission overhead factor (TOF) is 2.08. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Single path with 1-Fake SD pair 
B. Privacy with EXTROUT Technique 
 
Figure 4.  Baseline EXTROUT without duplicate path 
Fig. 4 shows the active nodes with number of packets 
transmitted using EXTROUT for single source S and 
destination D, shortest path L = 8 hops distance, Ks = 3 and Kd 
= 4. The attacker will guess location of the source/destination 
node out of the 15 indistinguishable nodes along the extended 
path. The anonymity level (privacy strength) for S or D is [1-
(1/15)], i.e 0.933. The unlinkability is high because it is not 
clear for the attacker which node is the source (originator of 
packet transmission) and destination (receiver of real packets). 
The transmission overhead factor (TOF) is 1.875. 
In Fig. 5, we have EXTROUT with 1 path 
duplication for single S-D pair at 8 hops distance, Ks = 3 and 
Kd = 4. The attacker will guess location of the 
source/destination out of the two paths of 15 nodes length. The 
anonymity level is 0.967. By inspection, the unlinkability of 
real S-D is higher and TOF = 3.75. EXTROUT with 2 
duplicated paths (diagram not shown for brevity) for the same 
single S-D pair at 8 hops distance, Ks = 3 and Kd = 4, gives 
anonymity level 0.978 and TOF is 5.625. 
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Figure 5.  EXTROUT with 1 duplicate path 
Fig. 6 shows EXTROUT with 5 duplicated paths S-D 
pair at 8 hops distance, Ks = 3 and Kd = 4. The 5 different 
paths have lengths 14, 15, 16, 16 and 19 hops between 
Anchor_S and Anchor_D (purple color cells). The attacker 
has to guess location of the source/destination out of the five 
paths, therefore anonymity level is 0.987 and TOF is 10. 
 
Figure 6.  EXTROUT with 5 duplicate paths 
C. EXTROUT with Fake S-D Pair 
 
 
Figure 7.  EXTROUT with 1-Fake SD pair 
In Fig. 7, we show the result of EXTROUT with 1 
fake S-D path added for single source-destination pair at 8 
hops distance, Ks = 3 and Kd = 4. The fake extended path has 
length 17 hops between fake Anchor_S and fake Anchor_D. 
The attacker has to guess location of the source/destination by 
choosing one of the extended paths and then selecting the 
correct real S-D nodes pair, which gives anonymity level equal 
to 0.983, i.e. (1/total length of both paths). In this case, TOF is 
4.25. EXTROUT with fake path gives better performance 
(higher anonymity, lower transmission overhead) than 
EXTROUT with duplicate paths. 
Fig. 8 shows the privacy level performance of 
EXTROUT for different source-destination distances (L hops). 
100 randomly chosen source-destination pairs of different 
lengths (3, 4, 5, …, 16 hops) are generated and EXTROUT 
privacy technique is applied. When the S-D path length is 
short (e.g. 3 to 5 hops), EXTROUT (with random value of 
Ks=2 & Kd=2) or (with random value of Ks=2 & Kd=3) has 
higher transmission overhead factor (TOF) and the 
corresponding privacy gain is lower. Using EXTROUT for 
source-destination nodes far apart (e.g. > 10 hops) gives 
stronger privacy level (> 0.96) for the same transmission 
overhead cost.  
 
Figure 8.  EXTROUT- Anonymity Performance 
 
Figure 9.  EXTROUT- Privacy Strength v/s TOF 
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EXTROUT mechanism is adaptive for small and large S-D 
separation in ad hoc wireless networks and for a given privacy 
level, the transmission overhead associated with it is lower 
than for single path with N-fake S-D pairs. Fig. 9 shows the 
relationship between anonymity level and TOF incurred by 
each privacy technique for single source-destination case at 
L=12 hops. 
D. Results Discussion  
EXTROUT privacy technique provides good performance 
tradeoff between anonymity level and transmission overhead. 
We summarize the results in Table I. Note |Pn| is length of 
duplicate path and |Pf| is the fake path length. 
 
TABLE I.  PRIVACY PROTOCOLS REVIEW 
Increasing the length of extrapolated route, the anonymity 
of EXTROUT will increase but at the cost of extra 
transmission overhead. With EXTROUT privacy technique, 
the privacy is maintained as long as all nodes on extended path 
from Anchor_S to Anchor_D are alive (broadcasting), and the 
attacker can only guess the real source/destination node. With 
path duplication enhancement, EXTROUT will further 
camouflage real packet transmission route. EXTROUT has 
relatively moderate transmission overhead cost (which can 
vary) since the shortest S-D path is maintained (minimum 
delivery latency). The protocol provides flexibility of privacy 
level for source and destination nodes mutually. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Providing maximum privacy in single source-destination 
case is a critical and challenging issue due to obvious traffic 
analysis attacks. In this work, an efficient and flexible privacy 
technique, EXTROUT, is presented to protect source-
destination location privacy in the presence of a global 
adversary with network-wide traffic knowledge. Our 
analytical and simulation results show that EXTROUT 
provides better privacy (anonymity) to overhead ratio than 
simple fake source-destination privacy scheme in ad hoc 
wireless networks. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT  
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
REFERENCES 
[1] K. Mehta, D. Liu and M. Wright, “Location Privacy in Sensor Networks 
against a Glocal Eavesdropper” ICNP 2007. 
[2] J. Deng, R. Han, and S. Mishra. “Decorrelating Wireless Sensor 
Network Traffic to Inhibit Traffic Analysis Attacks” Elsevier Pervasive 
and Mobile Computing Journal, Vol. 2(2), April 2006. pp. 159-186. 
[3] M. Shao, Y. Yang, S. Zhu, G. Cao, “Towards Statistically Strong Source 
Anonymity for Sensor Networks” IEEE INFOCOM 2008, pp. 466-474. 
[4] J. Deng, R. Han, and S. Mishra, “Countermeasures Against Traffic 
Analysis Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks” in Proc. of 
IEEE/CerateNet Conf. on Security and Privacy in Communciation 
Networks (SecureComm) 2005. 
[5] S. Capkun, JP Hubaux and M. Jakobsson, “Secure and privacy-
Preserving Communication in Hybrid Ad Hoc Networks” EPLC-IC 
Technical Report no. IC/2004/10 
[6] S. Jiang, NH Vaidya and W. Zhao, “Power Aware Traffic Cover Mode 
to Prevent Traffic Analysis in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks” IEEE 
INFOCOM 2001. 
[7] X. Wu and E. Bertino, “An Analysis study on zone based Anonymous 
Communication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks” EEE Trans. on 
Dependable and Secure Computing, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2007. 
[8] Y. Jian, S. Chen, Z. Zhang and L. Zhang, “A Novel Scheme for 
Protecting Receiver’s Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks” 
IEEE Trans. on Wireless Comm.,Vol. 7, No. 10, Oct. 2008. 
[9] Y. Xi, L. Schwiebert, and W. Shi, “Preserving source location privacy in 
monitoring-based wireless sensor networks,” 2nd International orkshop 
on Security in Systems and Networks (SSN ’06). 
[10] P. Kamat, Y Zhang, W. Trappe, and C. Ozturk. “Enhancing source 
location privacy in sensor network routing”. In Proc. of the 25th IEEE 
Int. Conf. on Distributed Comp. Systems (ICDCS), pp. 599-608, June 
2005. 
[11] C. Ozturk, Y. Zhang, and W. Trappe. “Source Location Privacy in 
Energy-constrained sensor network routing”. In SASN ’04: Proc. of 
ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, 2004. 
[12] H. Choi, P. McDaniel, Thomas F. La Porta, “Privacy Preserving 
Communication in MANETs”. IEEE SECON 2007 
[13] C. Intanagonwiwat, R. Govindan, D. Estrin and J. Heidemann. “Directed 
Diffusion for Wireless Sensor Networking” IEEE/ACM Trans. on 
Networking, Vol 11, No. 1, 2003. 
[14] R. Doomun, T. Hayajneh, P. Krishnamurthy, and D. Tipper, 
“SECLOUD: Source and Destination Seclusion Using Clouds for 
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks” In. Proc. of ISCC 2009. 
[15] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes 
for sensor networks,” in Proc. of IEEE SSP, 2003. 
[16] W. Du, J. Deng, Y.S. Han, and P.K. Varshney, “A key predistribution 
scheme for sensor networks using deployment knowledge” IEEE Trans. 
On Dependable and Secure Comp., vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 62-77, 2006. 
[17] M. Gruteser and D. Grunwald, “Enhancing location privacy in wireless 
LAN through disposable interface identifiers: a quantitative analysis” 
Mobile Network Applications, vol. 10(3), pp. 315-325, 2005. 
[18] Y. Zhang, W. Liu, and W. Lou, “Anonymous communications in mobile 
ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2005. 
[19] J. Kong, X. Hong, and M. Gerla, “An identity-free and on-demand 
routing scheme against anonymity threats in mobile ad hoc networks,” 
IEEE Trans. on Mob. Comp., vol. 6(8), pp. 888–902, 2007. 
[20] Y. Yang, M. Shao, S. Zhu, B. Urgaonkar, and G. Cao, “Towards Event 
Source Unobservability with Minimum Network Traffic in Sensor 
Networks” WiSec 2008. 
[21] K. PN Puttaswamy, A. Sala, C. Wilson and B.Y. Zhao. “Protecting 
Anonymity in Dynamic Peer-to-Peer Networks” IEEE ICNP 2008. 
[22] L. Sweeney “Achieving k-Anonymity Privacy Protection Using 
Generalization and Suppression” Int. Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness 
and Knowledge-based Systems, 10(5), 2002, pp. 571–588. 
[23] D. Huang, “Traffic Analysis-based Unlinkability Measure for IEEE 
802.11b-based Communication Systems”, WiSe ’06 Sept. 29, 2006. pp. 
65-73. 
[24] D. Huang, “Unlinkability Measure for IEEE 802.11 Based MANETs” 
IEEE Trans. on Wireless Communications, Vol. 7(3), 2008. 
[25] J. Kong and X. Hong. ANODR: Anonymous On Demand Routing with 
Untraceable Routes for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks”. Mobihoc’03, June 
2003 
[26] J. Chen, A. Jiang, Iyad A. Kanj, G. Xia, and F. Zhang, “Separability and 
Topology Control of Quasi Unit Disk Graphs” IEEE INFOCOM 2007. 
 
19th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN 2010), Zurich
